Hotelling's competition with general customer distributions

Hotelling and his critics assumed uniformly distributed demand. In this note the solution is characterized for any distribution F and some propositions follow. For any F an equilibrium does not exist if the duopolists are located too closely together, but another distribution can be always found for which an equilibrium does exist. When we observe duopolies in equilibrium with closer and closer proximity we can expect the density in the area of contention to go up and prices and profits to go down. Hotelling's known suggestion that any duopolist has an advantage to move his location towards the other, and thus creating a tendency for the differentiation to diminish, holds whenever an equilibrium exists.     

Incorporating Behavioral Anomalies in Strategic Models

Behavioral decision researchers have documented a number of anomalies that seem to run counter to established theories of consumer behavior from microeconomics that are often at the core of analytical models in marketing. A natural question therefore is how equilibrium behavior and strategies would change if models were to incorporate these anomalies in a consistent way. In this paper we identify several important and generalizable anomalies that modelers may want to incorporate in their models. We briefly discuss each phenomenon, identify a key unresolved issue and outline a research agenda to be pursued.     

RULE RATIONALITY

We study the strategic advantages of following rules of thumb that bundle different games together (called rule rationality) when this may be observed by one's opponent. We present a model in which the strategic environment determines which kind of rule rationality is adopted by the players. We apply the model to characterize the induced rules and outcomes in various interesting environments. Finally, we show the close relations between act rationality and “Stackelberg stability” (no player can earn from playing first).     

A particle swarm model for estimating reliability and scheduling system maintenance

Modifying data and information system components may introduce new errors and deteriorate the reliability of the system. Reliability can be efficiently regained with reliability centred maintenance, which requires reliability estimation for maintenance scheduling. A variant of the particle swarm model is used to estimate reliability of systems implemented according to the model view controller paradigm. Simulations based on data collected from an online system of a large financial institute are used to compare three component-level maintenance policies. Results show that appropriately scheduled component-level maintenance greatly reduces the cost of upholding an acceptable level of reliability by reducing the need in system-wide maintenance.     

Behavioral Decision Making in the (Q,R) Purchasing Model: An Experimental Study

This paper presents and analyzes the results of a decision‐making experiment in inventory management under uncertainty. The experiment included 81 participants who played the role of a small car importer facing random demand as in the (Q,R) model. The results show strong evidence of learning and convergence, and the average reorder point (R) closely approaches the optimal level for maximizing profits. However, the participants' decisions are still biased by realizations of extreme values of demand and loss of potential sales. We argue that participants are affected by recency, loss aversion, and, possibly, their own risk aversion. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Class Analysis and Earnings Inequality: Nested and Non-Nested Comparisons of Two Class Models in Israel

This paper demonstrates how nesting and non-nesting analytical strategies provide different answers regarding the comparative utility of theoretical models. This paper demonstrates this incompatibility by testing the empirical efficacy of Goldthorpe's and Wright's class schemes in explaining earnings inequality in Israel. These models are non-nested, because while they partially overlap each other conceptually and empirically, neither can be written as a parametric restriction of the other. As they are non-nested, we cannot test each model against the other by using the conventional sociological approach to hypotheses testing. For the sake of demonstration, however, we show results obtained from the conventional Ordinary Least Squares regression models with conventional Baysian Information Coefficient statistic, serving as criterion for a decision rule. Wright's model was found to be more significant in explaining earnings variations in Israeli society. Yet when we used two models of non-nested specification tests (the Cox-Pesaran model and the J test) to examine each model's unique contribution, neither of these models were able to reject the rival hypothesis. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

中国新一代务实型消费者

中国消费者的行为方式正与发达国家的消费者越来越相像。与过去相比，他们变得越来越挑剔，也越来越实际，他们的视野更加开阔，超越了对产品功能的基本关注。此外，他们越来越愿意为更高的产品价值和质量而花钱，并且花费更多时间研究产品，以及探究产品之间的细微差别。     

Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.     

Giving at the close: Experimental evidence on cooperation in contributing to a public good

We present a simple dynamic model of contributions to a public good. We test the model by conducting a public good game experiment and fundraising experiment among religious Jewish students for the procurement of sustainable supplies for their campus synagogue. The results of the experiments show a high level of cooperation; particularly, the results of the public good experiment show that contributions are above the predicted optimum. Nevertheless, in accordance with the economic theory, we find that the contribution path is upward sloping and contributions increase with the benefit of the public good. Our findings also suggest that the level of contributions and their path are affected by peer and gender effects.     

On the learnability of majority rule

We establish how large a sample of past decisions is required to predict future decisions of a committee with few members. The committee uses majority rule to choose between pairs of alternatives. Each member's vote is derived from a linear ordering over all the alternatives. We prove that there are cases in which an observer cannot predict precisely any decision of a committee based on its past decisions. Nonetheless, approximate prediction is possible after observing relatively few random past decisions.